This paper investigates the emergence of retail clusters on supply chains comprised of suppliers, retailers, and consumers. An agent-based model is employed to study retail location choice in a market of homogeneous goods and a market of complementary goods. On a circle comprised of discrete locales, retailers play a non-cooperative game by choosing locales to maximize profits which are impacted by their distance to consumers and to suppliers. Our findings disclose that in a market of homogeneous products symmetric distributions of retail clusters rise out of competition between individual retailers; average cluster density and cluster size change dynamically as retailers enter the market. In a market of two complementary goods, multiple equilibria of retail distributions are found to be common; a single cluster of retailers has the highest probability to emerge. Overall, our results show that retail clusters emerge from the balance between retailers' proximity to their customers, their competitors, their complements, and their suppliers.
Introduction
Rules governing the agglomeration and dispersion of economic behavior depend on numerous factors that may impact firms' motivations and strategies. Empirical studies have found that hierarchical distributions of economic activities and resources exist in almost every city, region, and nation (such as the US carpet production industry concentrated in Dalton, Georgia (Krugman, 1991a) and the Italian textile industry in Prato (Porter, 1990) ). From a systems perspective, urban areas are not only concentrations of places and people, but also "systems of organized complexity" where a large number of quantities vary simultaneously and" [interrelated] into an organic whole" (Jacobs, 1961) .
Adopting a similar view, we attempt to understand what can promote the concentration of human activities. This understanding suggests two insights we need to consider in modeling this phenomenon: first, numerous supply chains are interwoven in the urban milieu; second, structural and behavioral patterns of cities result from all kinds of economic agents' interactions. Our interest in the micro-foundation of the clustering of retail businesses leads us to study retailers' relationships with suppliers and consumers, and their impacts on large-scale clustering patterns.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literature on the mechanism of business clustering and the agent-based approach in modeling urban systems. Section 3 describes our agent-based framework of a three-layer supply chain network. Section 4 displays and analyzes the simulation results. The implications of the findings are discussed in Section 5. Lastly, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Literature review
Business clustering patterns have been a topic of extensive study. Traditional economic geography theories explained spatial distributions mainly through differences in underlying characteristics, say, geography, labor, and products (Marshall, 1890; Weber, 1909; Christaller, 1933; Lösch, 1940; Ottaviano and Puga, 1998) . For instance, central place theory posits a hierarchy of communities in terms of a variety of stores, where goods of higher order tend to stay farther away from each other than goods of lower order in that they serve a larger threshold population; moreover, higher-order places offer all the goods offered at lower-order ones, but not vice versa (Christaller, 1933) . The findings are very intriguing; Christaller's theory, nevertheless, cannot explain how such patterns gradually emerge.
When researchers began to search for the "invisible hand" that contributes to agglomeration, they resorted to the micro-explanations with different hypotheses about the causes, such as pure competition (Hotelling, 1929) , different orders (by importance) of food (Eaton and Lipsey, 1982; Quinzii and Thisse, 1990) , transport cost (Fujita and Ogawa, 1982) , economies of scope (Fujita et al., 1988) , and economies of scale and imperfect competition (Krugman, 1991b) . Krugman further argued that firm location choice is balanced by centripetal and centrifugal forces (Krugman, 1991b (Krugman, , 1996 . The centripetal forces include market-size effects, thick labor markets, and pure external economies; the centrifugal forces include high land rents, immobile factors, and pure external diseconomies. In addition, some other research found that the interactions between upstream and downstream firms can result in agglomeration, wherein multiple equilibria may exist Venables, 1995, 1996) . While these models implied the functioning of supply chains, they did not explicate the balancing forces stemming from the interactions of different business agents.
Since 1960s, with the development of computing technology, many computerized prototype models have been built to assist planning and policy development in metropolitan areas; most models were mathematically or behaviorally based. Examples include the highly disaggregated EMPIRIC model (Hill et al., 1966) , the Detroit prototype of the NBER Urban Simulation Model (Ingram et al., 1972) , the TRANUS model (de la Barra et al., 1984) , the ITLUP model (Putman, 1991) , the MEPLAN model (Hunt and Simmonds, 1993) , the California urban futures (CUF) models (Landis, 1994; Landis and Zhang, 1998 ) (see (Wegener, 2004) for a historical review). Yet such models did not adequately tackle the increasing complexities of the interactions between a variety of components in urban systems. To meet this challenge, some new planning supporting systems have been developed. A case in point is the UrbanSim program which incorporated the interactions between land use, transportation, environment, and urban policies by modeling the behavior of urban agents at different levels (Waddell, 2002; Waddell et al., 2003) .
In recent years, agent-based models have gained popularity in revealing the complexity of spatial interactions, dynamics, and self-organization (Portugali, 1999; Parker et al., 2003) . Urban systems have been modeled as complex systems where complex systematic properties can emerge out of simple interactive rules among different agents. Some models have ex-amined the evolution of environmentally based land-cover systems Webster, 1998, 2000; Brown et al., 2005; Webster, 2003; Evans and Kelley, 2004) and of humans' settlement patterns (Sanders et al., 1997) . Additionally, there are some models focusing on residential development modeled in a grid-cell environment (Manson, 2000; Berger, 2001; Berger and Ringler, 2002; Parker and Filatova, 2008) . Other microscopic modeling approaches include fractal growing (Batty, 1991; Batty and Xie, 1999) and space syntax (Peponis et al., 1998; Batty and Rana, 2004) . Whereas the models provided different insights on the selforganization of urban clusters, they have not seriously addressed transport costs. Dealing with transport cost in a more rigorous and mature way, while likely adding to the complexity of the model, is necessary to gain a better understanding of the effects of networks on spatial locations.
By explicitly tackling business interactions on supply chains, we employ the agent-based approach to explain the emergence of retail clusters from a microscopic perspective. The agents, connecting on supply chains, are consumers, retailers, and suppliers. This research appropriates and applies the notions of centripetal and centrifugal forces in economics (Krugman, 1991a (Krugman, , 1996 , indicating that urban space can self-organize into order and pattern even based on simple and decentralized decisions of individual firms and consumers.
3 The model
Assumptions and definition of cluster
On a simplified three-layer supply chain, products flow from suppliers, via retailers, to consumers; cashes proceed in the opposite direction. All agents are presumed to own perfect information; they locate at a circular area of discrete locations. The idea of a circle, probably first adopted in Hotelling (1929) , has the following advantages: (1) one-dimension (which simplifies the model and highlights the embedded economic mechanism); (2) providing an enclosed area (which is similar to a de facto geographical region and limits the number of location choices for retailers).
Two kinds of markets are tested based on this framework: first, a market of homogeneous goods; second, a market of two complementary goods which entails consumers' trip chaining behavior in shopping. The computational models are programmed in java, where each agent is modeled as an object. In the beginning of each round, consumers patronize retailers based on their rules to meet their needs on the product; after consumers finish shopping, retailers calculate their profits (revenue -cost) and assess the profitability of other locales. At the end of each round, given others are fixed, each retailer moves to the locale that can provide the highest profit. The locales and profits of retailers are updated for each round.
Before elaborating the agents' rules, it is important to define a cluster for this research. A cluster is defined as an agglomeration of retailers which are geographically adjacent or co-located. The density of a cluster is calculated as the number of retailers in a cluster divided by the number of locales in the cluster. The average cluster density of n retailers, ϕ n , is formulated as:
where α i is the number of retailers in cluster i; τ i is the number of locales covered by cluster i; M represents the total number of clusters. Some examples about calculating cluster density can be found in Fig. 1 .
Consumers
In a market of homogeneous goods (named x) with W x total number of retailers, a consumer selects a retailer to patronize based on its attractiveness, which depends on the observable shortest distance between the consumer and the retailer and other unobservable factors. For example, for consumer p, the attractiveness index A pi of Retailer R xi (the ith number of retailers of product x) is represented as:
Where d pi is the shortest distance between consumer p and retailer i; k 1 and the scaling parameter β are positive constants. The function indicates that longer travel distance would generally diminish consumers' willingness to shop. White noise p shows a certain degree of randomness.
In a market of two complementary goods sold by two kinds of retailers, let R xi indicate retailer i of product x, and R yj indicate retailer j of product y. A trip is defined as a roundtrip for a consumer from home to visit R xi and R yj so as to buy both goods. Given W x number of R xi and W y number of R yj , there are in total W x · W y trip candidates.
The utility for consumer p to patronize retailer R xi and R yj (indicated by Pair t) equals:
After calculating all retailers' attractiveness indexes, a consumer probabilistically selects a retailer to patronize. In a market of homogeneous goods, the probability for consumer p to patronize retailer R xi (indicated by ρ pi ), is calculated based on a simplified version of Huff's model (Huff, 1964) :
In the market of two complementary goods, the probability for consumer p to visit R yj can be similarly calculated.
The Roulette Wheel selection method is adopted for a consumer to select a retailer in each round. This approach indicates that retailer i with higher ρ pi for consumer p has a greater probability to be selected by this consumer. A consumer's probabilities of patronizing all retailers comprise a wheel of selection, which is updated for every round. A spin of the wheel selects a retailer; once a retailer is selected, a consumer buys all needed products from this retailer. The sequence for consumers to patronize retailers is randomly decided for each round.
Retailers
Retailers connect suppliers and consumers on supply chains. In each round, a retailer evaluates expected profits of all locales and moves to the locale of the highest profit. For example, retailer R xi 's expected profit in locale m, Π xm , is calculated as:
Where λ x indicates a customer's demand on product x (with total N customers); ρ pm stands for the probability for consumer p to patronize the retailer in locale m; θ x means retail unit sales price of product x (a constant in the model); δ x means supplier unit sales price of x (a constant); u is the transport cost per unit distance per product; σ mk indicates the shortest distance between supplier k of product x and locale m; γ mk is a binary variable, which equals 1 if a retailer in locale m patronizes supplier k. N p=1 λ x · ρ pm represents total expected sales of products in locale m. The part in brackets refers to expected profit per product, equaling sales price minus cost. A retailer's cost includes the purchasing cost of products from a supplier and the shipping cost which is proportional to shipping distance and quantity of products. Here we assume a retailer patronizes its closest supplier. After evaluating profits of all C locales on the circle, retailer R xi moves to the locale that provides the highest expected profit Π xi , given others are geographically fixed at that time. It is presumed that each retailer can only move once per round; the sequence of moving is randomly decided.
Suppliers
We assume that all suppliers keep the same unit sales price. Moreover, they are evenly distributed on the circle and are fixed in all rounds. Further, in the market of two complementary goods, suppliers of the two products co-locate. Suppliers can always produce enough goods to meet market demand.
Results and analysis

The market of homogeneous goods
The basic setting is a circle of 100 discrete locales, where 5000 consumers and 5 suppliers are evenly distribute. Different scenarios are tested with different retail numbers ranging from 2 to 100. The parameter values of this model (Model 1) are shown in Table 1 . We examine retail geographical distribution patterns when stable patterns emerge (i.e. no retailers change their locales). Fig. ? ? shows the numbers of clusters and cluster densities given different number of retailers. As can be seen, as retailers increases from 2 to 10, the number of clusters rises to 5 (the same number as suppliers). In particular, when 10 retailers partake in the game, retailers double up at supplier locales; the average cluster density therefore becomes two. As more retailers enter the market, the number of clusters remains flat; retailers in the clusters stay adjacent to each other while centering around suppliers. The average cluster density declines to one, while the distribution pattern remains almost symmetric. As the number of retailers approximates 100, which equals the total number of locales on the circle, all clusters connect with each other and each cell is occupied by one retailer. Some examples of retail distribution patterns are illustrated in Fig. 3 .
The above analysis indicates that when the number of retailers is no more than 10, the centripetal force (proximity to suppliers) induces them to double up in suppliers' locales, while the centrifugal force (proximity to customers) keeps the distribution pattern symmetric. As the number of retailers continues to grow, retailers tend to disperse themselves on the circle; the existence of centripetal force, however, keeps them near suppliers. Different numbers of retailers in the competition beget different distribution patterns.
To further explore the effects of the centripetal and centrifugal forces on retail distribution patterns, sensitivity tests are performed on β and u. When examining different values of β or u, we set other parameters to be the same as in Table 1 .
First, we test the value of β from 0 to 2.0 (with step size 0.25) and for each case run the number of retailers from 2 to 30. Fig. 4 presents cluster densities for different values of β. We observe that when β is larger than 0.5, retail distribution patterns are similar to the base case (β = 1.0) described above. When β equals 0 or 0.25, the retail pattern considerably differs from other cases. When β equals 0, retailers are evenly distributed and only locate in supplier locales for all scenarios of different numbers of retailers. This is because as β equals 0, consumers are indifferent to travel and retailers therefore stay in supplier locales to minimize cost. It is interesting to see that all retailers amass in only one supplier's locale; cluster density therefore equals the number of retailers. This is an artifact of the simulation model that retailers choose the first most profitable pattern and don't consider alternative locales of exactly equal profits. They might just as easily cluster uniformly or non-uniformly in any supplier's locale.
We further change the value of u from 0 to 0.16, with step size 0.02. Fig. 5 shows cluster densities for different values of u. When u is larger than 0.08, retailers tend to double up on suppliers, as their number booms from 2 to 10. However, as the number of retailers rises to 15, only the case of u equaling 0.16 shows continuing accumulation of retailers in suppliers' locales, different from the result of our base case (where u equals 0.02). In particular, in the case of 15 retailers, every three retailers stay in a supplier's locale. When u equals 0.16, although the cluster density curve gradually falls as the number of retailers continues to increase, a rising trend of cluster density can still be noticed when the number of retailers ascends from 20 to 25.
The market of complementary goods
In the market of two complementary goods, we first examine the scenario of 10 suppliers of product x and 10 suppliers of y, every two of which co-locate and are evenly distributed on the circle. Table 1 shows the parameter values used in this experiment (Model 2). We first set 20 retailers (10 retailers of product x, 10 retailers of product y). Since multiple equilibria are possible, 200 different retail initial location patterns (seeds) are examined.
Given different initial conditions, our results disclose multiple stable patterns, which can be grouped into three categories by the number of clusters (although each individual retailer's final locale may vary in different outcomes). The most common pattern is only one cluster (with probability 0.725), where all retailers accumulate in a supplier's locale; the patterns of two clusters and three clusters emerge with probability 0.24 and 0.036. All the retail distribution patterns share two features: (1) retailers only stay in supplier locales; (2) the same number of retailers of x and retailers of y co-locate, indicating that they constitute pairs. It is interesting to notice that the evenly distributed pattern of retailers-every one retailer of x and every one retailer of y double in a supplier's locale-does not appear in this experiment. To further explore this possibility, we intentionally set the initial distribution pattern to be very similar to the evenly distributed one, which ultimately results in the evenly distributed pattern of retailers.
To understand the impact of the number of retailers on retail distribution patterns, we further vary the total number of retailers from 4 to 40 while keeping the same number of retailers of x and the number of retailers of y; other parameters are set to be the same as the base case. After testing 200 initial distribution patterns for retailers, except for the case of 4 retailers, our simulation results reveal multiple retail patterns for all cases. Fig. 6 shows the probabilities for different retail clusters. It is interesting to notice that the pattern of only one cluster has the highest probability to appear for all cases. Moreover, by observing the trend of the histograms of one cluster for different numbers of retailers, we can notice that the greater gap between the number of retailers and the number of suppliers (which is 10 for each category of products), the more likely that retailers congregate in one cluster. The largest number of resultant clusters is 4; the probability of its happenstance nonetheless never exceeds 0.05.
But what if we have different numbers of retailers of complementary goods?
We vary the number of retailers of product y from 2 to 16 while fixing the number of retailers of x to be 10. 200 seeds are also tested for each scenario. The probability distribution for clusters of different sizes is shown in Fig. 7 . Overall, we find that the greater gap between the number of retailers of product x and the number of retailers of y, the more likely fewer clusters will emerge. Like our previous results, the case of one cluster has the highest probability to emerge and retailers only locate in suppliers' locales. Moreover, when there are more than one cluster in the distribution pattern, the ratio of the number of retailers of x to retailers of y in each cluster is very close. To illustrate, Fig. 8 shows some retail distribution patterns for 10 retailers of x and 15 retailers of y. Such interesting phenomena purport that retailers can self-organize themselves into clusters of similar structures.
Discussion
Our agent model in the market of homogeneous goods and the market of complementary goods produces the emergence of retail clusters. In a market of homogeneous goods, clusters tend to be symmetric. When retailers are few, they accumulate in suppliers' locales; as the number of retailers increases, they spread out around suppliers and incrementally occupy the whole circle. Moreover, a larger scaling parameter (absolute) value for consumers tends to make retailers more dispersed, and higher unit shipping cost makes retailers more concentrated around suppliers. Such results exhibit the balance between proximity to the market and proximity to suppliers which impacts the retail distribution pattern.
In the market of two complementary goods, multiple equilibria of retail distribution patterns are found to be common; nevertheless, the case of only one cluster-where all retailers accumulate in a supplier locale-is most likely to emerge. Moreover, the greater gap between the number of retailers of x and the number of retailers of y, the more likely dense clusters are to emerge. A further extrapolation suggests that in the market of homogeneous goods, the case of one cluster cannot be stable in that some retailers in the big cluster can easily move to an open space on the circle to occupy a larger market. In the model of complementary goods, however, since consumers consider total travel distance for buying both goods, retail location choice depends not only on their distance to suppliers and consumers, but also on their distance to retailers of complementary goods. Furthermore, for the patterns with more than one cluster, our results imply that emergent clusters, however different in size, tend to have a similar composition in terms of the ratio of retailers of complementary goods.
In central place theory, Christaller (1933) claimed that in the areas with evenly-distributed population and resources, settlements have equidistant spacing between centers of the same order; high-order services are farther away from low-order services. Yet, this research demonstrates that even in a market of two equally important products, hierarchical distribution patterns can also autonomously emerge. This comports with the notion of retail districts found in many cities, such as the Kappabashi district of Tokyo specializing in kitchen equip-ment (and plastic sushi) along with similar examples of clustered competitors (Levinson and Krizek, 2008 ). In our model of complementary goods, although the evenly-distributed retail pattern can occur under certain circumstances, to achieve this each cluster requires a very specific timing, which has a high requirement for initial seeds and the sequence of location choice. Therefore it is much less likely to naturally emerge than the hierarchical patterns. Overall, our results find autonomous emergence of retail clusters; the hierarchical distribution patterns (in particular, the pattern of only one cluster) appear with a high probability.
Conclusion
This paper builds an agent-based model to examine retail location choice on a supply chain network of consumers, retailers, and suppliers. In a market of homogeneous goods, we find symmetric retail distribution patterns, and average cluster density changes dynamically as retailers join the market. These patterns are affected by shipping cost and consumers' willingness to travel. Our findings demonstrate that the development of a market does not always lead to condensed retail agglomerations. Moreover, the balance between transportation cost and market size considerably impacts the size and density of clusters.
In a market of two complementary goods, assuming suppliers of the two products co-locate and evenly distribute themselves, we find self-organizing retail clusters with features different from the results of the first model. First, multiple equilibria of retail distributions are common. Second, co-locating of retailers of complementary goods appears with a high probability. Moreover, the likelihood of clustering increases with the gap between the number of retailers of complementary goods and the gap between the number of retailers and the number of suppliers. Third, when more than one cluster occurs, however different in size, the ratio of the number of retailers of one product to the number of retailers of the other product tends to be close for the emergent clusters. Our results illustrate that competition among retailers on supply chains (especially when considering trip chaining for complementary goods on the part of the customer) is sufficient to produce clustering; other mechanisms (such as the desire of customers to comparison shop) are not required, but may also be additional source of clustering behavior. We have not identified whether there is a necessary assumption to produce clustering.
Future research should address the efficiency of such self-organized retail patterns in terms of social welfare, as opposed to a more evenly distributed one (such as posited in central place theory). Empirical studies should also test the hypotheses presented in this research. Figure 1: Exemplary retail distribution patterns on a circle of discrete locales. Fig. 1-1 has five clusters, each of which has only one retailer; therefore average cluster density equals 1. Fig. 1-2 has three clusters, one cluster has two adjacent retailers; one cluster has only one retailer; the rest one has two co-locating retailers. The average cluster density equals (2+1+1)/3 = 1.33. Fig. 1-3 has two clusters; one cluster has only one retailer, while the other has four retailers covering three locales. The average cluster density equals (1+4/3)/2=1.17. Figure 3: Examples of retail distribution patterns for different numbers of retailers in a market of homogeneous goods (plotted in P ajek (Batagelj and Mrvar, 2009) ). (Red circles stand for retailers, and gray diamonds represent suppliers. Objects sitting on top of each other mean that they share the same locale; adjacent objects indicate that they are geographically adjacent.) Fig.3 -1 displays the distribution pattern of 5 retailers. Fig.3-2 shows the pattern of 10 retailers. Fig.3-3, Fig.3-4, Fig.3 -5, and Fig.3-6 respectively exhibit retail spatial patterns for 20, 30, 60, and 100 retailers. to 40 (where the number of retailers of x equals the number of retailers of y), with total 20 suppliers (10 suppliers of x and 10 suppliers of y). The case of one cluster has the highest probability to appear of all the cases; the greater gap between the number of retailers and the number of suppliers, the more likely that retailers tend to cluster. Additionally, retailers of x and retailers of y only stay in suppliers' locales and constitute pairs. Figure 7: Probability distribution of the numbers of clusters with 10 retailers of product x and the number of retailers of y ranging from 2 to 16 (shown in the horizontal axis). The case of only one cluster has the highest probability to emerge. The greater gap between the number of retailers of product x and the number of retailers of product y, the more likely that the case of fewer clusters will emerge. Retail cluster of product y Figure 8 : Some retail distribution patterns (with more than one cluster) in equilibrium for 10 retailers of x and 15 retailers of y (plotted in P ajek (Batagelj and Mrvar, 2009)) . A red circle stands for a retail cluster of x; a blue cross represents a retail cluster of y. Two shapes laid together show that they co-locate. The number in each shape indicates the number of retailers. All retailers are found to stay in supplier locales.
In Fig.8-1 , the ratio of the number of retailers of x to the number of retailers of y for the two clusters respectively equals 3:5 and 7:10. The ratio of the number of retailers of product to x the number of retailers of product y tends to be close for the emergent clusters. Similar phenomena can be found for other results.
